Chandra Mohanty and the Technology of Gender

by Ingrid Hoofd
Utrecht, 18th of June 1997



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Introduction

The general aim of this paper will be to explain the idea of the technology of gender and especially as how it is appropiated by Teresa De Lauretis and Chandra Talpade Mohanty in respectively "The Technology of Gender" and "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses".

First, I will give an outline of the feminist epistemological framework both De Lauretis and Mohanty want to shift away from; frameworks of thinking about man and woman as theorized by feminists like Simone De Beauvoir. Then I move on to De Lauretis' proposition on dealing with concepts of femininity and how she is conceptualizing the feminist subject. More deeply then I will plunge into the critiques and new proposals of Mohanty, who takes race, or rather location, as her central viewpoint. Mohanty is making a move rather similar to the one De Lauretis makes, as I will make clear, though the former focuses mainly on the issue of white-centeredness in Western scholarship. Both thus inhabit a critique as well as a taking over of certain feminist strategies of the theories they react to.

Furthermore, I will place the different theories into a more broader overview of diverse feminist theories and epistemologies. Doing so I want to show how De Lauretis and Mohanty are reacting on specific notions within certain feminist scholarship and how the latter has developed further out of this; hopefully this will make clear how necessary this shift also has been for feminism as it then was bound to get stuck in some essentialistic ideas and left a lot of women very frustrated. In describing the broader frames in which to put several basic feminist schools of thought I will use the outlines given by Braidotti, Eagleton and others.

And finally I will give my own view on all this, developing some pro's and contra's. My main focus will be on Mohanty's article in this. Of course a lot of critique later came from the postmodernist feminists; however, I think the kind of feminism set out by Mohanty and De Lauretis can still be useful in some ways. Which shows that one should always watch out not to reject the good with the bad.

Shifting away from Woman as lack and victim

Woman as not-Man

During the Second Feminist Wave the theorization the position of women in society was newly taken up. This conceptualizing of woman was done in order to reveal how the patriarchal ideology was thought to work and to show how masculinity within this ideology is attempting to put up an air of being the universal, whereas femininity is used as it's mere projection. A major pioneering work on this field was for instance Simone de Beauvoir's Second Sex. Later on several other feminist scholars, like Kate Millett, took up De Beauvoir's ideas.

As Rosi Braidotti lucidly points out in her book Nomadic Subjects this description of the difference between men and women resulted in a dichotomy were 'normal subjectivity' is masculine subjectivity which is then phallogocentric, universal, rational, capable of transcendence, self-regulating, conscious and denying bodily origins, whereas the female is then conceived as the lack, the other-than-the-subject (which is then seen as an automatical devaloration), irrational, uncontroled, immanent and identified with the body. De Beauvoir thus thought that the best feminist political and theoretical thing to do for women was to gain the same entitlement to subjectivity as men. Women thus had to go for transcendence and rationality in order to bring their existence, which De Beauvoir thought as being yet unrepresented, into representation. In short, in her scheme Woman is seen as minus-Man or Woman as the Other. Braidotti calls this working scheme sexual difference level one.

The Marxist model of power

This idea of Woman as lack is closely connected to the model of power as developed by Marx and which was also taken over by various feminist scholars in order to describe the oppression of women in a patriarchal society and the feminist answer to this. In Marx' view power consisted of the binary 'oppressors versus oppressed' . The oppressors are then the group who have something (power, that is) and the oppressed group are the mere victims of the oppressors and the subsequently lack something.

This model of power then was being connected with the humanist idea of each individual having a 'true self', an inner core that builds the identity and character of the person. Mary Eagleton points out how this humanistic view of the individual results in a theory of alienation from it's 'true self' of that same individual under oppression; a person has a authentic identity which under oppression is no longer able to 'express' itself fully. Feminist theorists were taking up this idea and together with Freud's ideas on sexuality (the whole of the idea is called Freudo-Marxism) constructed a theory of sexual repression: women were disconnected from their 'true sexual self' under male dominance and thus sexual liberation for women is the main possible goal. When patriarchy would be overcome, women would be free and able to express their true feminine sexual feelings.

Out of the above described idea of a monolithic system of ideology followed for feminists directly that at the very point when a woman becomes aware of her being oppressed, she automatically would gain a feminist position. In other words, if you didn't exactly fit in the dominant branch of this monolithic ideology you were making a political statement automatically. This resulted in several 'consciousness raising' groups for women during the seventies in order to make them able to act out their feminist position inherent to their being women. Individual experience as a woman was the starting point and "the personal is the political" thus became an important and logic slogan in those times.

Although the theorizing of this sexual difference as the difference betweeen men and women and the conceptualization of the position of women as oppressed by male dominance was indeed useful as a start and giving a grip in order to describe and analyse the ways patriarchy functioned; this concept was soon to show it's limitations both in the practical as well as in the theoretical field. Why for instance were some women keeping up with patriarchy? Why did consciousness raising not do the job? If femininity was 'lack' and Woman was the oppressed victim, how then ever to get out of this purely negative position? As more and more feminists got frustrated, the idea was taken up to conceive of gender not as sexual difference, but as a social construction.

Teresa De Lauretis: The technology of gender

In her ground-breaking article De Lauretis states that thinking of gender as sexual difference now keeps feminist theory stuck in a patriarchal dichotomy which therefore gets universalized: woman as the difference from man. This concept prohibits analyzing differences among women, let alone differences within women, says De Lauretis; feminist theory is thus complicit to the sustaining of a binary that is invoked by patriarchal ideology. She gives a critique of feminist theory working with the Marxist notion of power relations, as it relies on a universal and homogeneous oppression of women prior to their entry in the social and historical field. Furthermore, this concept of gender as sexual difference keeps attempts of radical feminist thinking of conceiving the subject in a totally different way, in this case other than the dominant 'masculine' notion of rational and unified subjectivity, at a long distance. De Lauretis thus draws attention to the epistemological framework with which feminist theory was working.

In order to deconstruct this binary of Man (oppressor, subject, at the centre) versus Woman (oppressed, other, marginalized) she uses the theory of representation, or semiotics. Gender, she states, is a representation, and it's social construction is this representation of gender. Gender is not (biological) sex, but a system of meanings predicated on the conceptual dichotomy of two biological sexes. Thus gender assigns (constructed and therefore theoretically changeable) identity, status, value and location in family structures to individuals within a certain society. Gender thus has the function of constituting individuals as men and women, she says. She here equates gender with the Althusserian notion of ideology of which he said that it had the function of constituting concrete individuals as subjects. Now, any system of representation or constitutive (like cinema and books, but also for instance everyday family life or feminist theory) that helps carrology of gender.

The model of power she here uses she takes from Michel Foucault. He found the Marxist idea of power as oppressors versus oppressed, a rather negative view of power, far too simplistic and stated that power should be seen as having a double structure, which he called potestas (the power you are subjected and entitled to; is reactive) and potentia (the potential you have for; is active). He thus sees power as a positive, creative and constituting force and said that it is a process in which we all, although in different ways, are involved and being constituted as subjects. The subject is thus historical and unstable. So when gender is seen as to work through such a model of power you can no longer speak of men as oppressors versus women as oppressed victims. Which is the discourse also feminist theory was constantly repeating, says De Lauretis.

Anti-heterosexism

To get away from this dichotomy which doesn't leave room for more radical changes of the patriarchal framework, she goes on to a sort of 'queer theory'; we have to displace the idea of the masculine at the centre and deconstruct the binary man versus woman. The former is criticized by De Lauretis as being inherently heterosexist and we thus have to go beyond this heterosexual framework. Affirming other sexualities than the heterosexual one can be a getaway from the universalistic notion of gender as sexual difference.

Moreover, De Lauretis suggests a new framework to get 'Woman' out of the negative pole of this rigid binary, she states that the theoretical slippage which is constanly being made is the confusion of this representation of Woman with real life women. These 'real life women' are historically and culturally positioned beings. These women are, she says, at the same time both inside and outside gender representations; there is no direct and complete overlapping of Woman as representation and real life women. Women are affected differently by patriarchy in different social groups, whether this are differences in race, class, sexuality or whatever other socio-cultural sets.

So she moves from the classical 'gender as sexual difference' within which Man is seen as having subjectivity, being rational, conscious and disembodied (the classical positive pole) versus Woman as Other, lack, irrational and immanent (the negative pole) to a new working scheme, namely Woman as representation (where Foucault would lay the 'institution of femininity') versus real life women who are embodying a multiplicity of differences and thus resisting heterosexism and gender; women are not the mere victims of patriarchal oppression as their historical and cultural backgrounds give them a certain amount of agency in their specific patriarchal ideologies for as we can see with the Foucaulian model of power, power has also a positive side to it as you are not only subjected to it but it also gives you a potency for certain entitlements. In other words, because of ideology and power structures you can make an investment to work out your subjectivity. The next question then will be, of course, whose investments yield more relative power.

Now in the conceptual space between this Woman as representation and real life women De Lauretis poses the feminist subject; the latter is in her idea "she who resists the institution of femininity". The feminist subject is aware of the twofold pull between the institution of femininity and the reality of women. Being a woman thus doesn't automatically give you a feminist position as was being the case in the 'gender as sexual difference' and Marxist model of power structures. 'Woman' is being contradictory and diverse inside. De Lauretis in this way opens up a space for theorizing the differences among women, which Braidotti calls sexual difference level two in the before mentioned chapter of her book. Any feminist project therefore will involve the politics of location, as situatedness is a crucial notion here. The shift made by De Lauretis from the phallologocentrical 'Woman as Other' towards real life women I will call the De Lauretis-shift.

Chandra Talpade Mohanty: criticism of Western hegemonic scholarship

A shift rather similar to De Lauretis' one, only on a different field, is taken up by Chandra Mohanty in her article "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses". In short, she uses this De Lauretis-shift not only on gender, but also on ethnicity, thus proposing a anti-white-centrism (as De Lauretis was proposing an anti-hetero-centrism). In this article Mohanty wants to give a criticism of hegemonic Western scholarship on the big scale and of the colonialism in Western feminist scholarhip in particular. In fact, she does a renaming of the feminist position coming from the post-colonialist Other. This project is, as well as De Lauretis' project, typical for feminist theory in the eighties which was a reaction to certain ideas in feminist theory in the seventies.

The colonialist move

In a number of Western radical and liberal feminist writings Mohanty detects the so-called 'colonialist move' which consists of producing the third world Woman as a singular and monolithic subject. This constituting of a colonial Other in these white Western feminist texts on women in the third world is, according to Mohanty, due to three analytical presuppositions in these texts.

First of all, the assumption of the category of '(third world) women' as a coherent group with identical interests experiences and goals prior to their entry in the socio-political and historical field. This Western feminist discourse defines third world women as being subjects 'outside' social relations instead of looking at the way these women are constituted through these social structures. Economic, religious and familial structures are judged by Western standards; the 'typical' Third world Woman is thus being defined as religious, family-oriented, legal minors, illiterate and domestic. The attitude of white feminists towards third world women is thus very paternalistic, as if it is saying to them that 'they' are not yet that far in feminism but we will impose our Western ideas upon them and show them how to get feministic. Through this producing of a Third World Other, white Western feminists are discursively representing themselves as being sexually liberated, free-minded, in control of their own lives and secular. Behind all this lies the Western universalistic notion that the 'third world' hasn't yet evolved to the extend the West has. Mohanty's position on this arrogant Western universalism implicitly carries also a anti-humanist message, as she wants to do away with the humanist notion of the subject as a coherent rational secular monolith. Note also that Mohanty here is referring to a self-representation of Western feminists and not to a material reality. We also saw this slippage being criticized by De Lauretis.

Secondly, the model of power which these Western feminist writings imply, namely the humanist, classical notion of men as oppressors and women as oppressed is taken up by these white scholars. This concept is defenitely not adequate, says Mohanty, as it implies a universal notion of patriarchy and thus only stresses the binary 'men versus women'. Furthermore, in not taking into account the various socio-political contexts, women are 'robbed' of their historical and political agency. This also was a strong argument De Lauretis in a way made in her article. Mohanty is thus, like De Lauretis, pleading for a politics of location and a more Foucaulian model of power, so that both the colonialist move made by some Western feminist scholars can be made explicit as being a discursive institution, and that third world women, placed in their own particular historical and political contexts, now can have moments of empowerment and with this a diverse, heterogeneous sort of subjectivity. In this way, Mohanty is deconstructing the idea of 'first world woman as subject' versus the 'third world woman as object' which eventually leads to an opening up of theoretical space to talk about differences among third world women, and women in general.

And thirdly, Mohanty criticizes Western methodological practices which are over-simplified and are in fact just trying to find 'proof' of various cases of powerless women in order to support the above mentioned classical notion of (third world) women as powerless victims. The white feminist concept of 'sisterhood' is therefore also criticized by Mohanty, as it implies a false sense of common experiences and goals; as if all women are oppressed by a monolithic, conspiring sort of patriarchal dominance. This idea certainly can't be fruitful, says Mohanty; it only paralyses women. Rather than 'sisterhood', the idea of solidarity appeals more to her.

Thus Mohanty is, in a way parallel to what De Lauretis proposes as a working scheme, trying to show the space between the Third World Woman as representation versus real life (third world) women. Careful studies that take into account the historical and socio-political backgrounds of different and diverse third world women will help to empower these women. The idea of a politics of location, or 'situatedness', is as the above shows a very important point with Mohanty. Consequently, also Mohanty wants to do away with the too simple Marxist or 'juridico-discursive' model of power which consists of the dichotomy 'oppressors (who have something) versus oppressed (who lack something)'.

So by criticizing this white Western feminist scholarship Mohanty is in fact killing two birds with one stone, namely deconstructing the binary 'first world woman versus third world woman' and the binary 'men as oppressors versus women as victims'. And in my view she is not only taking up for various real life women but also holding a mirror to Western feminists in order to make them aware of their whiteness and the colonial history that comes with this and to help create a more effective way of feminist scholarship which will be helped by listening to the voice of the 'post-colonial Other'.

Post-colonial 'black' standpoint feminism

This notion of trying to create a 'better' sort of feminist scholarship while voicing the 'other' of the traditional dichotomy makes me place Mohanty's theories fit into a particular school of feminist though, the so-called standpoint feminism. Crucial to this is the idea that 'the oppressed know better' as they are sort of 'bilingual'; they both know dominant and repressed discourse. Thus the oppressed can make certain alternative knowledge claims that come with their position.

Although Mohanty makes a slight move towards postmodern feminism in which the idea of 'situated knowledges' is an important one, she doesn't get there as she is partly speaking still in a tradition of enlightment as the way knowledge is made isn't under complete discussion. Postmodern feminism however totally rejects the idea of enlightment, rationality and humanism. Mohanty only rejects the hegemonity and whiteness of Western humanism, but not the concept of rational humanism as a whole. However, her standpoint isn't as explicit as for instance Patricia Hill Collins'. She indeed is very clearly constructing a black female epistemology and wants to make different black knowledge claims. Her ideas, however, get fairly essentialistic as she is for instance connecting black femaleness with caring, spirituality, bonding and various other 'black woman' stereotypes. But with her also, as is rather typical for Mohanty as well, the 'standpoint' question can be found 'who has the authentic experience to produce black feminist knowledge?' Who is entitled to produce black feminist knowledge claims?

This for standpoint feminism very important notion of experience has been under much criticism from the postmodern feminist corner. Theorists like Joan Scott or bell hooks for instance criticize the idea of experience for also being a construction within ideology, like the notion of a singular identity as a whole. Identity, says postmodernism, is relational and existing only in interaction. From this point of view, the location you are at at that specific moment is the point of departure and the body is seen as your primary location. So then we are not any more talking about a singular identity but about various multiple and contradictory identities. This postmodern discussion later opens up space to discuss the 'differences within each woman' which Braidotti then calls sexual difference level three. But as far as this Mohanty and De Lauretis do not get.

However, I certainly wouldn't agree that standpoint feminism is nowadays completely outdated, though it has being criticized for it's essentialistic tendencies and singular notion of identity. Standpoint feminism is still a useful strategy, as we can see what's still hapening in a lot of paternalistic 'development' literature. I would suggest that for the complete 'development' idea as a whole we must still repeat Mohanty's words: "... only from the vantage point of the west is it possible to define the third world as underdeveloped and economically dependent". Also, Mohanty is criticizing the Western feminist idea that secularization is the first step towards feminism. Secularization may have played a big role in the becoming of a white Western feminist consciousness, but this may certainly not be so for women globally. Moreover, white feminists tend to forget the diversity, the importance and the posibilities for empowerment of religions in other places of the world, she says.

Connected to the postmodern critique on Mohanty and other standpointers, I have some questions to add myself. Firstly, Mohanty is never really talking about 'black' or 'white' women, but about first world and third world women. As it isn't quite clear if she refers to a purely geographical difference, I wonder what she would call for instance an Central African woman living in Europe already for quite a long time or 'second generation' Chinese girl living in America. And secondly, she takes the colonialist and imperialist history of 'The West' to be a rather singular notion, whereas I think the history of the United States is one very much different from, let us say, the Dutch one and consequently has different racist 'blind spots'. Nevertheless Mohanty has made a step in a useful direction to criticize white feminist racism.

Conclusion

Summing up of what Mohanty wants in "Under Western Eyes", we can conclude the following: she wants to do away

With the latter she comes close to postmodern feminism (also with her rejecting some Marxist ideas), but on the whole we can conceive of her theory as mainly fitting into (black) standpoint feminism which opens up space for differences among women. The pointing towards the 'colonialist move' some white feminists are making is in my opinion a good step towards promoting more self-reflexivity in feminist scholarship.

Bibliography

  1. Mohanty, Chandra: "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses". In: Feminist Review, no. 30, autumn 1988.
  2. De Lauretis, Teresa: "The Technology of Gender". In: Technologies of Gender. Indiana University Press, Bloomington & Indianapolis, 1987.
  3. Braidotti, Rosi: "Sexual Difference as a Nomadic Political Project". In: Nomadic Subjects. Colombia University Press, New York, 1994.
  4. Foucault, Michel: "Afterword". In: H.L. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1983.
  5. hooks, bell: Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics. London, Turnaround, 1991.
  6. Eagleton, Mary: Working with Feminist Criticism. Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
  7. Hill Collins, Patricia: "Defining Black Feminist Thought". In: Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment. Routledge, London/New York, 1991.
  8. De Beauvoir, Simone: Le deuxième sexe. Editions Gallimard, Paris, 1949.



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